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Foucault’s Overlooked Organisation: Revisiting his
Critical Works
Michela Betta
Abstract In this essay I propose a new reading of Michel Foucault’s main thesis
about biopower and biopolitics. I argue that organisation represents the neglected
key to Foucault’s new conceptualisation of power as something that is less politi-
cal and more organisational. This unique contribution was lost even on his closest
interlocutors. Foucault’s work on power had a strong influence on organisation
and management theory but interestingly not for the reasons I am proposing.
In fact, although theorists in management and organisation studies have empha-
sised power in relation to discipline, control and subjectivity they have overlooked
the transformative meaning of Foucault’s organisation. His work on biopolitics
has attracted opposition, too, as evidenced by the controversy sparked by
Giorgio Agamben about Foucault’s biopolitics. From Agamben’s critique, it
appears that Foucault’s notions of politics and power do not allow a deconstruc-
tion of the violence of the concentration camp. However, a critical reading of
Primo Levi’s biographical narratives reveals the camp as a place where the prison-
ers’ ability to organise their daily lives secured survival. To make sense of Levi’s
revelation, I use John Dewey’s notion of habits as forms of organisation and recon-
nect it to Foucault’s organisation. A shared understanding of the objective con-
ditions of human activity and experience highlights the similarities between
Dewey’s pragmatism and Foucault’s pragmatic metaphysics. In the end,
however, Foucault’s metaphysical background has caught up with him, pushing
him away from his own most radical proposal that organisation was the new
form of power and the new substance of politics.
Foucault’s organisation as the new form of power and politics
I propose to reflect on Foucault’s work about power and politics anew. A
crucial aspect of his work has surprisingly been overlooked, particularly in
regard to the notion of organisation. My main objective is to show that Fou-
cault advanced a notion of power that took the form of organisation. Through-
out his work, organisation is presented as something that makes power
possible, not only in political but also in personal terms. Foucault’s power is
concrete action, cutting through, producing and establishing a variety of poss-
ible relations between individuals and between individuals and institutions.
In the late 1970s, Foucault suggested that modern power needs bodies and
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population to exist, which is why he called modern power ‘biopower’ and its
policies ‘biopolitics’. To put individuals and population at the centre of
modern political rationality, however, a transformation of political sovereignty
was necessary. In this regard, Foucault argued that in order to include individ-
uals and population productively in the political calculations of modern gov-
ernments, new policies were required that aimed to enhance life through new
scientific/medical and social practices. Such policies, or biopolitics, changed
the way in which governed and governors interacted with each other and
had the additional effect of overcoming the old sovereign state in favour of
the government of the many (Foucault 2008). This is an apparently innocuous
thesis that, however, contains the idea of the end of sovereignty and the dimin-
ishing role of the law. The inclusion of life in the calculations of power at the
dawn of the eighteenth century, Foucault argued, marked modern govern-
mentality (Foucault 1981, 1991, 2008). He described this passage from the clas-
sical age to modernity as a ‘biological threshold of modernity’ (seuil de
modernite´ biologique), stating that ‘for millennia, man remained what he was
for Aristotle – a living animal with the additional capacity for a political exist-
ence – and that modernman is an animal whose politics places his existence as
a living being in question’ (1998: 143). Foucault also added that the new power
and its biopolitics are characterised by individualising and totalising strategies
targeting life and body (1981, 1983a), and finally, that biopolitics no longer
works within the rationality of the law and rights but rather as an economic
government that organises, manages and administers the life of individuals
and of the population (2008).
Accordingly, power is not alignedwith the law as amodel: ‘It is this image
that we must break free of (qu’il faut s’affranchir), that is, of the theoretical pri-
vilege of law and sovereignty, if we wish to analyse power within the concrete
and historical framework of its operation’ (Foucault 1998: 90). With the rise of
power against sovereignty, Foucault further suggested, the law becomes the
norm and helps to normalise social and personal relationships rather than to
discipline or regulate them. Under such conditions, power does not destroy
life but administers it. A normalising society becomes the outcome of a tech-
nology of power that coheres around life because power is now ‘organized
around the management of life rather than the menace of death’ (Foucault
1998: 147). Through taking care of life and the organisation of its (re)produc-
tive resources, power gains access to the body, opening up a completely
new field of action and conduct. Foucault (2007) pointed to a new economy
of conduct where one is conducted and conducts oneself at the physical
level of body and life. The prefix ‘bio’ that Foucault attached to politics and
power underlines this new taking care of life. It is new because it is driven
by an economic perspective of productive meaning, and because power and
politics now aim to organise life. Hence, we should not be too concerned
with this prefix because Foucault neither used physical science to strengthen
his case, nor privileged biological thinking. The ‘bio’ describes the content
of politics and power in a changed epistemic configuration that he described
as the power–knowledge nexus related to government and conduct. Because
of this, however, Foucault’s contemporary scholars have focused too much on
trying to shed light on this nexus, and by so doing have lost sight of his more
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productive thesis at the level of the emerging new form of power. This new
form is characterised by organisation.
It has certainly not been easy to position Foucault’s work, especially for
his contemporaries. But although many did not understand Foucault’s new
methods, they clearly saw the ‘re-orienting task of Foucault’s work’ (Said
1972) and the profound effects he had on traditional methods and analyses
(Deleuze 1988; Veyne 1978, 1997). Barthes (1972) was one of the first theorists
to realise that Foucault represented a shake-up of the intellectual establish-
ment of the 1960s and 1970s by observing ‘here is a first shock to our intellec-
tual habits’ (1972: 24) or, as Said (1972: 7) called them, ‘habits of thought’. It
was especially Foucault’s wide-ranging analyses that, according to Smart
(1994b, 1995b), caught the traditional intellectual scene unprepared. Many
found that his work ‘did not fit easily within existing disciplinary categories’
while at the same time it had a ‘significant impact within a number of fields of
inquiry, ranging from philosophy, history, sociology, and political science to lit-
erary and cultural studies’ (Smart 1994b: 1). Smart took upon himself the task
of collecting all contributions related to Foucault published between 1960 and
1992. The amount of material collected led to the publication of seven edited
volumes under the overarching title Michel Foucault, Critical Assessments
(Smart 1994a, 1995a). From this collection of works about Foucault, it
appears that almost every author commented extensively on what Foucault
had written, often very minutely reconstructing his methodologies, assump-
tions and arguments. Intense scrutiny seems to have been applied in an
attempt to reconnect to the old truths that Foucault had challenged or
thrown out, rather than to embrace the new content emerging from his ana-
lyses. Commenting on this attempt to keep him within a traditional under-
standing of reason, Clavel (1994) observed that many tried in vain to glue
back together what Foucault’s analyses had torn apart, namely the conscious-
ness of continuities, and by so doing they often missed the novelty of his work
(see also Sloterdijk 2010).
Foucault’s language might have played a role in how he was received. It
was a new language that used the archaeological method to free, to unveil,
what past analyses had covered up. Deleuze (1992) made an interesting obser-
vation in regard to Foucault’s language by declaring it to have ‘an oriental feel
to it’ (1992: 168), probably wanting to highlight by this his attention to detail.
And yet the space carved by this language is not small, neither is it neutral. As
declared a few years earlier by Said (1972: 27), in Foucault’s writing, the events
and people of the past return as ‘postmodern denizens of a wide space that is
generously impersonal, intellectually comprehended for all its discontinuities,
and far from being an unheroic field of verbal action’. This is why, according to
Bouchindhomme (1992), it is impossible to expect his language to represent
just one global view, or his style to have just one dimension, which is why
Veyne (2010: 2) called him a sceptical ‘dual being’.
In Volume 1 of The History of Sexuality (HS1) (1998), Foucault developed an
extraordinary language to capture themove toward life and the new substance
of politics. He spoke of ‘institutional crystallization embodied in state appar-
atus’ (1998: 93), power passing through ‘apparatus and institutions, without
being exactly localized in them’ (1998: 96), ‘life-administering power’ (1998:
136), ‘managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race’ (1998: 137),
Foucault’s Overlooked Organisation 3
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‘administering life’ (1998: 139), ‘the organisation of power over life’ (1998: 139),
‘the administration of bodies and the calculated management of life’ (1998:
140), ‘the administration of collective bodies’ (1998: 141), ‘the distributive
management of [the body’s] forces (1998: 141), ‘the management of life
rather than the menace of death’ (1998: 147), ‘the organizing principle of
two cultural forms’ (1998: 148), the ‘administration of sex’ (1998: 148), ‘control-
ling and administering the everyday life of sexuality’ (1998: 150), and ‘the
organisation of “erotic zones” in the social body’ (1998: 151). This new
language strongly revealed an understanding of power and institutional auth-
ority as things that are embedded in administration and management as
things that do not repress but enhance life. In HS1, Foucault took pains to
show the effects of the repression hypothesis. As Dreyfus and Rabinow
(1983: 131) stated, he masterfully unmasked it as ‘a deception to be revealed’.
The repression hypothesis is formed by several constitutive elements that are
engaged in an incessant interplay between truth and power, where to speak
the truth does not mean to be against power but rather to enhance it. In
HS1, however, Foucault was interested in tracing back the historical conditions
that led to the repression hypothesis by recasting it as a political technology
that he called bio-power. He then suggested that bio-power marked a shift
in the way governmentality operated that, however, remained invisible
because of the effects of traditional theories of sovereignty that regarded
power as a ‘juridico-discursive’ technology (Foucault 1998: 82).
Because Foucault’s line of reasoning is well known, I shall not dwell on it
here, focusing instead on the implications of his thesis. It seems that in
Foucault’s thinking, biopower is primarily an organisation that was cast as
administration, apparatus, and order. According to Dreyfus and Rabinow
(1983: xxvii), Foucault’s overall original contribution was his ‘pointing to
agreed-upon examples of how a domain of human activity should be orga-
nized’. Foucault understood bio-power to be a ‘pervasive organisation of
our society’, ‘with no one directing it and everyone increasingly enmeshed
in it, whose only end is the increase of power and order itself’ (Dreyfus and
Rabinow 1983: xxvi). Especially, the expression ’the administration of’ recurs
in almost all of Foucault’s works, and it is an expression that has become
very popular with many of Foucault’s scholars. The meaning of these
‘words as essences’ (Said 1972: 7) did alert his interpreters. Dreyfus and
Rabinow (1983) captured the meaning of Foucault’s new conception of politics
and power when they argued that, for Foucault, bio-politics focused on the
body ‘as the place in which the most minute and local social practices are
linked up with the large scale organisation of power’ (xxvi). Earlier, comment-
ing on the ontological approach opened up by Foucault’s analyses, Deleuze
(1988) observed that through Foucault’s work it appears that ‘man exists
only through the dissemination of various methods for organizing life’
(130). Further reflecting on Foucault’s notion of discourse, Deleuze argued
that discourse shows how power ‘organizes matters; or it forms or finalizes
functions and gives them aims’ (1988: 33). Gordon (1990: 11) saw discourse
as ‘the social organisation of subjectivity’ through which power becomes an
organising and ordering principle (Gordon 1991; see also Smart 1995a). As
noted by Davidson (1997: 7) Foucault’s discursive method brought to light
the conditions that had historically and socially formed things and language.
4 Michela Betta
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Veyne (2010: 119) tells us that Foucault thought that those conditions could be
unmade if one knew how they were made.
Despite the acute sensibility of these interpreters, I believe that they have
underestimated the real meaning of Foucault’s work in relation to power and
politics. They seem to assume that power puts organisation in place instead of
the other way around, where organisation is that which makes power func-
tion. Like many others, they, too, remained caught up in the tradition of
power and politics, and, as the previous citations suggest, they seem to
believe that Foucault was only pointing to an operative change in the way
in which politics and power acted on things and people. But if this were the
case, Foucault would have added very little to philosophy and social
science. It is when organisation becomes the new form of power, and organis-
ing becomes the new substance of politics, that different thinking becomes
possible. Here lies Foucault’s main contribution. That contribution has been
overlooked, and the oversight has made Foucault’s work appear to be solely
concerned with a critical reformulation of old political thinking rather than
with its complete rewriting.
The effects of Foucault’s work on the scholars of the late 1990s and early
2000s were not noticeably different from those of the previous decades. His
work on power became very important, particularly within the discipline of
management and organisation studies. But as it appears in the writing
of Fleming and Spicer (2014), in those years power was perceived within
these disciplines as something that made the modern organisation possible.
Now not even this seems to be the case anymore: ‘We predict that the shifting
nature of economic life currently defining large swathes of society will lead
researchers to focus not so much on organisation per se but financialization’
(2014: 286). Organisation still remains misunderstood. Foucault’s idea that
power relations are organised around social practices, that they are more ubi-
quitous than vertical, did not really have any impact on these disciplines. In
other words, although power was now acknowledged to be less top-down,
it remained/remains repressive, or controlling. The only addition was that
repression was now circular rather than vertical. Social theorists and political
philosophers also struggled with a more productive integration of Foucault’s
notion of organisation as the new form of power; it would have required some
changes in the way social activity was articulated in relation to political repres-
sion and economic exploitation.
In the next section of this essay, I deal with these interpretations and
critiques by also highlighting their shortcomings. I single out Agamben’s
critique because it most clearly shows how difficult it is to break out of estab-
lished theories. In the following section, I address Agamben’s critique. In
doing so, I draw on Primo Levi, especially from his work about the concen-
tration camp, and on John Dewey and his notions of habits. The reference to
these two authors has an important double effect: Levi and Dewey highlight
the importance of organisation for the individual and for social life, while,
at the same time, their stories and analyses strengthen Foucault’s idea of
power as organisation. Through Levi’s biographies it becomes apparent that
survival in the camp was not a question of having the right consciousness
but rather of having an innate or acquired ability to organise one’s life
under extreme conditions. Levi’s work adds substance to Foucault’s notion
Foucault’s Overlooked Organisation 5
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of power and freedom. Through Dewey it becomes possible to conceive of the
camp as a form of over-organisation.
My reference to Dewey extends further than this. I noted earlier that
Foucault’s interpreters overlooked the consequences of his thesis concerning
power as organisation. He might have contributed to this oversight in that
Foucault himself provided little evidence to support his claims (I return to
this issue later in the text). Dewey might help to overcome this shortcoming.
In arguing that habits represent forms of organised social practices, namely
social arrangements and interactions, he articulated something that was
implicit in Foucault. When Foucault observed that power targets population,
individuals and social relations, he certainly did not mean single individuals
and bodies. Power can only target people’s habits and social practices, and the
mentality behind them. It is at this level that Dewey’s work can be used
productively to shed light on how power is organised around social relations.
A comparison between Dewey and Foucault might surprise some. But as
shown by Rorty (1982), these thinkers share an interest in objectivity and
method. Rorty, however, is aware that methodological issues will not extend
to philosophical views on life and ethics, and I agree with his conclusion
that ‘we should see Dewey and Foucault as differing not over a theoretical
issue, but over what we may hope’ (1982: 203). It is from this difference con-
cerning hope that I draw my comparison between these two thinkers in the
section entitled ’Dewey’s pragmatism and Foucault’s pragmatic metaphysics’.
In the final section, ’What can we hope for?’, I discuss the main issues raised in
the essay and draw my conclusions.
I now turn to how, within management and organisation studies, as well
as within social theory and political philosophy, too little attention has been
given to Foucault’s notion of organisation.
Foucault’s overlooked organisation
Foucault had an enormous influence on management and organisation
scholars. It is not possible to reconstruct the exegesis of Foucault’s work
within the discipline of management and organisation, and any bibliographic
references can be but selective. However, it is obvious that Foucault’s influence
has played out in three major directions: power (and resistance) within the
workplace (Burrell 1988; Clegg 1994; Clegg et al. 2006; Clegg and Haugaard
2009; Courpasson and Dany 2009; Fleming and Spicer 2007; 2014; Halford
and Leonard 2005; Knights 1990; Newton 2004), discipline and control (Louns-
bury and Ventresca 2003; McKinley and Taylor 1998; Savage 1998; Starkey and
McKinlay 1998) and subjectivity and the self (Crane et al. 2009; Knights and
Morgan 1991; Nahamas 1998; Randall and Munro 2010). In all these works,
organisation is taken for granted inasmuch as it is understood as a given
place, usually the workplace, where relationships unfold under the banner
of control and repression. Foucault’s idea that power and politics are no
longer political but rather organisational does not find a productive resonance
within this scholarly field that seemsmore influenced by old political thinking.
Munro (2012) has reconstructed Foucault’s relevance within social
science, particularly management and organisation studies, by accurately
mapping out the various critical positions articulated within this field in
6 Michela Betta
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regard to Foucault’s work. Munro argues that there have been three interpre-
tive variations in relation to Foucauldian biopolitics: advanced liberal govern-
mentality, post-industrial mode of production and biocapitalist
governmentality. Worth mentioning are also scholarly works on organisation
as a process (Cooper 1990; Tsoukas and Chia 2003), where old notions of
organisation are definitely questioned. Although promising, however, the
idea of the process remains far too fluid to integrate Foucault’s contribution
productively, leaving the main question about the nature of organisation
unaddressed. A question problematised by Holmes (1990) several years ago,
and still unanswered, is, ‘What do we, can we, understand by organisation?
. . . A term which can refer to a concentration camp, a car hire firm, the
Lord’s Day Observance Society or a Train Spotter’ (1990: 198). But Munro is
correct in insisting that organisation and management scholars have failed
to elaborate on the new ‘post-disciplinary forms of organisation of control’
(Munro 2012: 359) anticipated by Foucault. If undertaken, such elaboration
would probably shift the whole meaning of organisation within the field.
But if management and organisational scholars have failed to recognise
the powerful implications of Foucault’s organisation for their discipline,
political philosophers and social scientists did not do better, and overlooked
the economic methods and organisational content of post-political power. In
this field, Foucault’s work has been criticised for abandoning the safe routes
of the rights discourse (McNay 2008, 2009; Myers 2008) in favour of a mentality
of opportunities, for introducing an economic perspective into political think-
ing based on self-interest (Honnet 2004; Kalpagam 2000; Tribe 2009), and for
not being critical enough of neo-liberalism and its notion of economic ration-
ality shaping modern government (Lemke 2001) – hence Habermas (1981: 13)
suggesting that Foucault was a young conservative. Although Foucault’s work
has been the object of extensive research in various fields and contexts for the
past 50 years, Deutscher (2012) argues that within political philosophy and
social theory such engagement with him has ultimately resulted in two dis-
tinctly separate hermeneutic analyses based on either life or sex. In her
detailed essay on Volume 1 of the History of Sexuality, Deutscher (2012)
argues that one of those who have emphasised life is Agamben. However, I
believe that how he has done so must be evaluated, particularly in the light
of his work on biopolitics and the camp. It is worth dwelling on Agamben’s
work because through the critique he articulates, Foucault’s contribution to
an understanding of organisation as the new form of power, and organising
as the new content of politics, becomes even more evident.
Agamben (1998: 4) argued that Foucault’s biopolitics cannot grasp ‘the
concentration camp and the structure of the great totalitarian state of the twen-
tieth century’.1 Agamben charged Foucault with turning the link between
individualising and totalising power into a ‘blind spot’. Agamben’s (1998: 6)
1But if Foucault was silent on the camp and the totalitarian state, it seems that
Arendt did not capture the essence of the totalitarian state as inscribed in biopolitical
sovereignty either. According to Agamben, the concentration camp does not represent,
as Arendt suggests, ‘humanmade hell’ (Arendt 1994: 240), but rather the very opposite
situation in which life becomes its trademark. ‘Only because politics in our age had
Foucault’s Overlooked Organisation 7
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intention is to unveil the ‘hidden point of intersection between the juridico-
institutional and the biopolitical models of power’.2 The camp is understood
by him to be a paradigm of neoliberal biopolitics.3 Contesting the Foucauldian
idea that with the advent of modernity the law and legal discourse have lost
their centrality, Agamben suggested that the law never stopped being at the
centre of power. However, it does not work as a direct normalising tool, as
was understood by Foucault, but rather through ban/abandonment.4 The
ban, or abandonment, is the way by which, in order to keep its position and
set the rule of privation, the law manages to apply itself by ‘(dis)applying
itself’ (Nancy 1993). According to Agamben, this move strengthens the
relationship between law and life, but only in terms of subjugation: ‘The
force of law is that it holds life in its ban by abandoning it’ (1998: 28–29). Aban-
doning is an act of violence that splits and bans forms of life deemed unworthy
of legal protection from what is perceived and classified as good life (to be
protected by the law). In speaking of the ban, Agamben suggests that targeted
life is still part of the biopolitical discourse but as something that must be
excluded. By incessantly reproducing the difference between good and bad
life, biopolitical sovereignty creates a state of exception that allows it to ban
with impunity (Agamben 2005). Drawing on Benjamin’s (1996: 242, 243)
idea that the exception has become the rule by becoming a law beyond
itself, Agamben further noted that by being the ‘pure space of exception’
(1998: 134), the concentration camp represents the exception turned into
norm. Agamben’s critique requires some debating. Foucault did mention the
menace of death that the Nazis brought about, but he regarded it as a case
of extreme authority based on blood and race, the old politics that ruled
with the law and the sword.
By speaking of the camp as a biopolitical paradigm, Agamben attempts to
move the camp experience beyond its territorial limit by suggesting that it is a
topographical and topological (spazio/soglia) space (see Giaccaria and Minca
2011). This move could be risky as it has the potential to undermine the
meaning of the camp and create a dispersion of the experiences that have
been captured by those who survived. Several authors have criticised
been entirely transformed into biopolitics was it possible for politics to be constituted
as totalitarian politics to a degree hitherto unknown’ (Agamben 1998: 120).
2Some questioned his critique, arguing that Agamben’s reading of Foucault is
structural rather than genealogical (Neal 2006).
3Agamben tends to lean toward Aristotle’s notion of paradigm where the part of
something (singularity) is analysed not in reference to a whole, or the whole in relation
to the part – that is particular versus universal or universal versus particular – but
rather the part is viewed as being concerned with the part. This means that the particu-
lar is understood in relation to the particular only. Such a move could neutralise the
dichotomous thinking contained in the opposition particular–universal and the
zone of undecidability that it creates. ‘The paradigm is neither universal nor particular,
neither general nor individual; it is a singularity which shows itself as such, and pro-
duces a new ontological context’ (2002: 3).
4The notion of the ban was originally developed by Jean-Luc Nancy in his book
The Birth to Presence (1993) that followed his highly controversial book The Inoperative
Community (1991).
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Agamben’s radical position because it seems to deny the possibility of resist-
ance (Ek 2006: 369). His sovereign as solid and stable over the centuries has
also been questioned (Long 2006; see also Ek 2006; Turner 2005), and some
lament that he did not give any ‘explanation for the sovereign’s repeated
victories and unstoppable march towards the camp’ (Kalyvas 2005: 115).
Finally, others have pointed out that a ‘fundamentally passive subject does
not exist’ (Vardoulakis 2010: 153–154). It seems that Agamben does not pay
close attention to how Foucault considered the case of consensus and violence,
suggesting that consensus and violence ‘do not constitute the principle or the
basic nature of power’ (Foucault 1983a: 220). Power, in his view, must always
be understood as acting upon an acting subject, even in its extreme formwhen
power constrains or forbids. There is a dramatic statement made by him in
Omnes et Singulatim (1981) that sheds some light on this condition:
A man who is chained up and beaten is subject to force being exerted
over him. Not power. But if he can be induced to speak, when his
ultimate recourse could have been to hold his tongue, preferring
death, then he has been caused to behave in a certain way. His
freedom has been subjected to power. He has been submitted to gov-
ernment. If an individual can remain free, however little his freedom
may be, power can subject him to government. (Foucault 1981: 253)
To Foucault there cannot be power without freedom because power is always
exercised over free individuals. To explore the meaning of power and freedom
in captivity we need to abandon the level of theoretical analysis and adopt a
biographical approach that will help us understand some of the living
conditions within the camp. To this purpose, I turn to Primo Levi. Through
Levi it emerges that there is no deeper spatiality to be discovered in the
camp, but evident, tangible, skin-deep experiences that need a biographical
account to be captured. Levi has an extraordinary ability to identify structures
and put people into them. He understands people’s strengths andweaknesses,
his included, because his observations are influenced by what might be called
physical psychology.5 There is no morality blinding him, and there are no
expectations of heroism.
Levi has an extraordinary ability to see people, relations and things as
they are. This is why his accounts always evoke a sense of practical
wisdom, increasing our understanding of the suffering of the human being
in captivity as a physical and psychological dimension. At the same time,
Levi can see beyond the sheer desperation and identify the instinct, the will
to live. Levi’s ability to capture what is at stake makes him write in a way
that every sentence contains a story. Like a stonemason, he sculpts his
words into his books, never taking decisions for us, always leaving us that
5In Mortal Questions (1979: 178) the moral philosopher Thomas Nagel mentioned
the notion of physicalism pointing to the philosopher Donald Davidson’s suggestion
that a psychophysical theory could help elaborate on the physical causes and effects of
mental events through physical descriptions. Such a theory has not been developed
yet but neuroscience might be the next step to it.
Foucault’s Overlooked Organisation 9
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [S
wi
nb
ur
ne
 U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 T
ec
hn
olo
gy
] a
t 0
1:4
8 2
6 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
5 
power or pain to draw conclusions. But he was not a sentimentalist; his
pragmatism was beyond question. In his major opus, If This is a Man (also
published under the title Survival in Auschwitz), Levi stated that everybody
sooner or later in life discovers that perfect happiness is not possible, but
that only a few ponder about the opposite consideration – that perfect unhap-
piness isn’t possible either. Levi’s instinctive rejection of any form of extreme
advantageously positions him in the middle from where he can observe how
prisoners organised their survival within a well-defined territory where
human nature faced unprecedented challenges. Through their power to organ-
ise their survival, those prisoners effectively undermined biopolitical sover-
eignty. To understand this we must enter Levi’s camp and trust his
narrative, aware that personal experiences are like pain. They are something
that ‘cannot be denied and something that cannot be confirmed’ (Scarry
1985: 13). This is a dilemma that we must navigate carefully.
Survival in the camp as a matter of personal organisation
Levi (1987) wrote one of the most dramatic reconstructions of life within a
concentration camp, especially from the perspective of those who, like him,
belonged to the saved and could therefore speak for those who ‘drowned’,
thus becoming the ‘witness and the archive’ (Agamben 1999). But contrary
to what Agamben does in Remnants of Auschwitz, where he logically recon-
structs the legitimacy of remembrance and the validity of testimony, in this
section I shall try to understand what and how or, better, through what con-
ditions, a concentration camp can exist. In doing this, I rely on Primo Levi’s
books (1987, 1988). In If This Is a Man (1987) , Levi mentions one of the recur-
ring sayings within Auschwitz: ‘When things change they change for the
worse’ (1987: 122). Change came to disrupt the little organisation that the
prisoners managed to build up individually in order to survive the systematic
attempts to destroy life in general and Jewish life in particular. This nuanced
differentiation between general and particular life is based on the distinctions
existing in the camp that included prisoners of war, political prisoners,
criminals and Jews (1988).6
The circumstances of the political prisoners were quite unique. First, as
anti-fascists they were ‘members of the secret defence organisation’ (1988: 7)
within the camp; secondly, they possessed a ‘cultural background’ that
helped them to ‘interpret’ the events around them; thirdly, they had ‘easy
access to statistical data’; and finally, they held positions of power within the
camp. Hence, the camp was a ‘stratified microcosmos’ (1988: 9) where there
were invisible pockets of resistance that allowed some to survive and caused
many others to die. Levi calls these ‘grey zones’. The grey zone is driven by a
‘network of human relations’ (1988: 23) where the separation of good from
6This social hierarchy, however, did not suspend anti-Semitism in the camp. In
more than one occasion, Levi showed that political prisoners were fighting the Nazi
regime in political terms and totally disregarded the fate of the Jews. And ordinary
criminals had even less scruples in this regard because many were fundamentally in
agreement with the Nazis.
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evil, inside fromoutside, thatmanyafter thewar tried to construe,wasnotposs-
ible. The campmanagement depended on destroying resistance by undermin-
ing any form of self-organisation – the ‘political ormoral armature’ (1988: 25) –
that the prisoners had to have in order to resist destruction. The grey zone was
madepossible byprotection and collaboration, and it both separated and joined
the two camps populated by ‘masters and servants’ (1988: 27). Levi seems to
suggest that survival was possible, although not guaranteed, by positioning
oneself in the middle; those who could not do so, because they did not have
the self-organisation that the camp violence required, drowned. These men
were called within the camp the Muselma¨nner (Muselmann in the singular)7,
an expression by which old prisoners named the weak, inept and those who
were selected for execution (1987: 94).8 Levi reconstructs the profiles of four
of the saved he met in Auschwitz (1987: 93–106). Theirs are dramatic stories.
In spite of their differences, these four prisoners had something in common:
they were great organisers, and through their ability to organise their personal
lives and meagre possessions, their networks and connections, enemies and
friends, they demonstrated the power to survive. The following four accounts
are from Levi’s book; I have condensed them.
Levi referred to a man called Schepschel. His ability to organise was excep-
tional. He was a man who had a prosperous business as a saddler before being
transferred to the camp. Levi described him as neither ‘robust, nor very coura-
geous, nor very wicked’. He believed him to be not particularly astute, still
deprived of a method that would have helped him to gain a little respite.
But Schepschel had the skill to combine situations and occasions productively,
and in doing so to innovate his own resources in an entrepreneurial bid to gain
the maximum advantage. This was a strategy that helped him set aside a little
bread that he used as capital to buy favours or buy/borrow tools to complete
other more sophisticated little jobs that secured his position within the camp.
Every opportunity was used to increase his capital even if this involved steal-
ing. He was unscrupulous and, when the situation required it, he sacrificed his
accomplice to gain favour in the eyes of the guards of the barrack block where
he was confined to, and also save himself from being discovered and punished
for stealing (Levi 1987: 98–99).
The second man was Alfred L. who to Levi embodied a technology of the
self that allowed him to survive in the camp. This technology of the self was
made of personal resources that took the form of ‘a solid and fruitful
7Because of the lack of testimony and biographical accounts from female
prisoners, we do not know how women selected for the final solution were referred
to. Perhaps there was not such a term for them. This could be why the compound
‘Mexico’ located outside the perimeter of Birkenau’s concentration camp, where
only female prisoners transitioned, has never been mentioned in the literature (see
Giaccaria and Minca 2011: 9).
8In my view, Levi’s description of the Muselmann as the complete and true witness
must be put into perspective. Levi was not theorising about the Muselmann. The
description is based on real, physical experiences. Hence, I do not to agree with
Davis’ (2004: 88) conclusion that Agamben’s philosophical closures have been influ-
enced by Levi. To blame Levi for Agamben’s own shortcomings is unfair. Vardoulakis
(2010), too, disagreed with Agamben’s representation of the Muselmann.
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“organisation”’ through which he protected his person. He gained the repu-
tation of a prominent person far before even becoming one through his face
and hands always being clean. Alfred L. never compromised on cleanness,
and by so doing he never bowed to the destructive discipline of the camp.
This discipline took hold of people as soon they started losing respect for
their own cleanliness. Alfred L. also managed to save bread from his own
ration, ‘so imposing upon himself a regime of supplementary privation’. He
developed a mentality of the provision and ‘carried it out with rigid inner dis-
cipline, without pity for himself or – with greater reason – for comrades who
crossed his path’ (Levi 1987: 99–101).
Levi’s thirdmanwasElias Lindzin, amanof short and strongbuildwhodis-
tinguished himself for his versatility and ability to work across a range of
professions without ever showing any fatigue and always entertaining
others. His physical constitution allowed him to carry out jobs under which
others collapsed and so he attracted the respect of the camp guards. ‘His
fame as an exceptional worker spread quite soon, and by the absurd law of
the Lager [camp], from then on he practically ceased to work’. His physical
indestructibility helped him to resist annihilation from within ‘because he is
insane’. Elias was ‘a good worker and a good organiser’ and his ‘insanity and
bestiality’ turned him into a ‘happy person’ within the camp but, Levi
remarked, he would probably not have been be as happy in a free society
(Levi 1987: 101–104).
Finally there was Henri, the ‘eminently civilised and sane’ man with his
excellent scientific and classical educational background. He had three theories
for survival: ‘organisation, pity and theft’. Through pity, ‘if ably cultivated’, one
gets access to other people’s feelings, even the ‘primitive minds of the brutes’
andbecomes their friendand secrets keeper.Henriwas exceptionally organised
and couldmake productive use of the time that he spentwith British POWsand
othermoreprominentpeople; this allowedhim to conduct ‘traffic ofproducts of
English origin’ that became his ‘monopoly’ which was ‘all a matter of organis-
ation’. His juvenile appearance evoked a sense of pity in others, and over time
he learned how to use pity to secure protection. Hemade use of these strategies
and acquired ‘conspicuous friendships’ that rarely forced him to use the third
method, theft (Levi 1987: 104–106).
Levi’s men opposed the violence that was inflicted upon them. They exer-
cised their freedom in whatever form they could. The camp represented a
world full of contradictions. In this respect, Levi stated that ‘even the most
perfect organisation has its flaws’ (1988: 2). It seems that Levi saw the camp
as an organisation that could be challenged by another organisation. He men-
tions that the political prisoners organised themselves as a form of internal
resistance. But it was the bodies, habits and practices of the Jewish prisoners
that engaged his mind in the camp and, later, his writing. It is through their
forms of self-organisation that a response to the brutal sovereignty of the
camp emerges as a powerful and painful reality. It is this physical reality
and the embodiment of anti-organisation that is missing in Agamben’s
work, where we see different stages of lives but no bodies. At one stage, as
if struck by a self-reflective impulse, Agamben wonders about the organis-
ational form of its paradigm (1998: 122). Of interest here is his suggestion
that the camp did not represent any economic advantage but rather an
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‘organisational burden’ (1998: 141). Levi tells us a different story. The camp
constituted, especially during the last years of the war, ‘an extensive and
complex system which profoundly penetrated the daily life of the country’
revealing how the camp was ‘not a closed universe’. Rather, Levi saw that
‘small and large industrial companies, agricultural combines, agencies and
arms factories drew profits from the practically free labour supplied by the
camps’ where prisoners were ‘exploited pitilessly and the inhuman conditions
within the camp never questioned’ (Levi 1988: 5).
FromPrimoLevi we have learned that life within a concentration campwas
driven by amultiplicity of actors and events thatwent beyond the single-minded
sovereigntyof biopolitics. Lifewas alive in the actions andbodiesof theprisoners
and it remained so until the very end through organisation as a form of anti-
sovereignty. We need to understand how this might have happened. Perhaps
the actions of Levi’smen can be described as resulting fromhabits and impulses.
To explore this, I draw on the work of the American philosopher Dewey (1922).
Dewey suggested that people’s lives are determinedby habits and that habits are
organised activities (1922: 89). Society represents institutions and culture (its
customs and practices), and this part of human life can under certain circum-
stances become ‘over-organized’ (1922: 103), particularly when habits become
rigid and resist change. Over-organisation cannot be challenged by habits them-
selves.Only impulse can challenge and, by sodoing, it reorganiseshabits.Dewey
compared habit to an adult and impulse to a child – the first meaning settled
experience, the latter fresh intelligence. The two are engaged in a struggle, but
it is not ‘civil warfare’ (1922: 99). In extraordinary crises, impulses ‘show by
wildviolent energyhowsuperficial is the control of routine’ (1922: 101), revealing
an interesting relationship between impulse andhabit. Impulse bringswith itself
the ‘possibility but not the assurance of a steady reorganisation of habits to meet
new elements in new situations’ (1922: 104). Impulse is understood by Dewey to
be a pivot of ‘re-adjustment, re-organisation’ being as it is ‘an indispensable
source of liberation’, a power insofar as it gives habits ‘pertinence and freshness’
(1922: 104–105).
To Dewey, freedom is facticity made of ‘environment and human wants’
(1922: 306–306). He acknowledged that there can be conflicts between
‘freedom and organisation’, but he further argued that the main problem
lies ‘not in organisation but in over-organisation’ (1922: 306). He found it
impossible to think of freedom without organisation: ‘there is no effective or
objective freedom without organisation’ (1922: 306). Dewey was concerned
with what he called ‘the moral potentialities of physical science’ (1922: 11)
and worried about the general disregard that moral science shows toward
human nature, perceived as something to be tamed because it is external to
a self-fashioned, virtuous self. Dewey warned that ‘there is no ready-made
self behind activities’, because active life results from ‘complex, unstable,
opposing attitudes, habits, impulses which gradually come to term with one
another’ (1922: 138). This is so because life is uninterrupted activity ‘as long
as it is life at all’ (1922: 135). This activity is linked to the ‘inconsistencies
and shiftings in character’ that one encounters in experience where ‘the rela-
tive fluidity and diversity of the constituents of selfhood’ (1922: 138) reveal the
precariousness of a prefabricated morality and moral self. The self builds in
and through activity, and conduct is where it manifests itself. It is also in
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this sense that Levi’s biographical narratives become so important for the
notion of organisation advanced within this article because they show how,
through organising their everydayness, Levi’s men acquired the power to
resist. Levi reinforces the notion that people are always acting in the present
and making sense of the present, no matter what physical and psychological
threats they are subjected to. Levi’s prisoners had habits that helped them to
cope with their world; their habits resulted from a coalition of physical body,
cognitive abilities and environment kept alive by hope.
To keep that cooperation working effectively, they had to organise their
everyday perception and actions quite minutely. It was an act of ‘skillful
coping’ (Dreyfus 2014). Dreyfus argues that ‘we are always already in a world
that is laid out in terms of our bodies and interests, and thus permeated by
relevance’ (2014: 106). That not many survived is not proof of their being
powerless, but rather of the extreme hostility of the world in which they
were living and with which they had to cope. I believe that this was Levi’s
sombre message. Under peaceful conditions, social life is shaped by shared
experiences, social arrangements and interactions and the environment.
Organisation under democratic conditions is less subjective as it relies more
on habits and practices shared by people. Individuals are not able to change
these habits and practices on their own. The process of change is always
social and it involves communities and governments, power and politics,
science and knowledge. If social conduct has to be changed, the process
must involve discourse and policies. Dewey, like Foucault, was interested in
conduct as something that has to do with people’s behaviours. I explore this
issue in the next section.
Dewey’s pragmatism and Foucault’s pragmatic metaphysics
Dewey’s theory of conduct and social psychology is based on the assumption
that body, experience and environment form a unity. This unity is represented
by habits and its main characteristic is that it cannot be changed directly. To
change habits it requires a ‘congenial, antecedently prepared environment’
(1922: 20). Social life forms through a productive and interdependent
cooperation of humans and things. Dewy acutely distinguishes between
materials, tools and proper means. Nails and boards, he argues, are materials
for making a box. And a hammer and saw are tools. They all turn into means
when they are ‘brought in conjunction with eye, arm, and hand in some
specific operation’ (1922: 25). At the same time, eye, arm and hand, are appro-
priate means only when they are in action and cooperating with external
materials and energies. Without an external support, the eye just stares and
the hand just fumbles. Our bodily organs become means when they enter
‘into organisation with things which independently accomplish definite
results’ – and according to Dewey ‘these organisations are habits’ (1922:
26).9 To change things we need means, and the means that, according to
9This discussion is reminiscent of Heidegger’s notion of ‘readiness-to-hand’ and
‘ready-to-hand’ in Being and Time (1962). Dewey and Heidegger share the notion of
experience and activity preceding thinking and reflection. It is impossible for me to
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Dewey, are closest to us, that are ‘within our power’, are habits (1922: 37).
Every habit incorporates some part of the world, the objective environment,
but no single habit, or group of habits, can incorporate ‘the entire environment
within itself or themselves’ (1922: 51). At the same time, however, Dewey
argued that the environment ‘is many, not one’ and that habits represent
adjustment of environment and not just to it (1922: 53). Habits compete
between and among each other, and they mutually modify each other, altering
the unity that characterises them. This alteration is caused by impulses. Dewey
regards impulses as fresh energy that enters an established organisation
(habits) and its culture (customs), causing an unsettling of tradition and
shared values. Conflicts between habits release impulsive activities that
require an adjustment of habit, custom and convention (1922: 87). When
impulse imposes itself deliberately against customs and habits, it signals the
beginning of individuality (1922: 87).
This individuality challenges habits, namely organised activities. Dewey
was interested in conduct and how organised activities, customs, and conven-
tions undergo changes in interaction. He stated that in conduct what is second-
ary becomes primary. From the perspective of an individual, instinctive
activity (impulse) comes first, but in human interactions (conduct) impulse
becomes secondary: the newborn begins life as a baby dependent on adults
with their formed habits (1922: 89). Hence, in conduct, impulses and instincts
need habits to accomplish tasks, even when they appear to be the driving force
of an individual.10 Thus, impulse in conduct represents a re-adjustment, a re-
organisation, in habits. When this reorganisation brings freshness and perti-
nence to habit, impulse has liberated power (1922: 105). ‘Impulses are the
pivots upon which the re-organisation of activities turns, they are agencies
of deviation, for giving new directions to old habits and changing their
quality’ (1922: 93). But it would be wrong if we were to think that Dewey,
by arguing in favour of habits, was introducing a mechanistic understanding
of human activity. ‘Without habit there is only irritation and confused hesita-
tion. With habit alone there is a machine-like repetition, a duplicating recur-
rence of old acts. With conflict of habits and release of impulse there is
conscious search’ (1922: 180). Dewey was interested in showing that individ-
ual freedom cannot materialise out of a solipsistic individual practising
virtues and morality in isolation. Certainly, no one can deny that the individ-
ual is the bearer of experience and that human activity always implies
reconstruct this discussion in the present essay, but I have elaborated on their simi-
larities and differences in my forthcoming book on Heidegger.
10Dewey did not differentiate between the two. This is because impulse alone
evokes the idea of something that is loose, undirected. But in connection with
human instinct it acquires a cultural meaning. He argued that animals live within a
ready-made instinct, while human beings can adapt and change their instinct, and
so by cutting across various activities their instincts become an activity that can be
learned within an organised life. ‘In learning habits it is possible for man to learn
the habit of learning’ (Dewey 1922: 105). I shall not enter into this discussion, confining
myself to the comment that in the past 50 years a more sophisticated knowledge of
how animals organise their safety, group life and reproduction has prompted some
serious revision of our notion of animal instincts.
Foucault’s Overlooked Organisation 15
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [S
wi
nb
ur
ne
 U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 T
ec
hn
olo
gy
] a
t 0
1:4
8 2
6 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
5 
interactions between individuals, and individuals and institutions. Inter-
action, however, is a form of coping with, and adjustment of and to, environ-
ments, and is always embedded in habits and social practices. Dewey
provocatively states that ‘It thinks’ is a truer psychological statement than ‘I
think’.
The question is whether this it thinks can be reconciled with Foucault’s
subject. Foucault’s subject, particularly in HS1, is a dual individual – at
times weak and subservient to power relations, and at times strong and organ-
ising/shaping them. The idea of power through and in human activity rep-
resents Foucault’s theoretical specificity. This specificity positions him
between different traditions without making him actually embrace any.
Dreyfus and Rabinow tried to capture Foucault’s uncommitted position to
established theoretical methodologies in the title of their 1983 bookwhere Fou-
cault is set beyond hermeneutics and structuralism. Discussing Foucault’s
power, Simons argued that ‘it is difficult to locate Foucault on the political
map we have inherited from the nineteenth century’ (1995: 103). Hence, it
becomes impossible to classify him in terms of oppositional or affirmative
politics because doing so would undermine his whole idea of complexity
(Simons 1995: 3). Olssen (1999), too, pondered over Foucault’s methodological
positioning. He accurately identified Foucault as a materialist, but not as ‘a tra-
ditional’ materialist because of his interest in the background beliefs that ‘con-
stitute experience’ (Olssen 1999: 33).
Power, argued Foucault, as a concentrated or diffused form does not exist.
It ‘exists only when it is put into action’ (1983a: 219). Power is a mode of action
that does not work directly on others but acts upon their actions revealing ‘an
action upon an action, on existing actions or on those which may arise in the
present or the future’ (1983a: 220). Hence, the exercise of power ‘consists in
guiding the possibility of conduct and putting in order the possible
outcome’ (1983a: 221). This putting in order must be understood in terms of
the organising form of power. Power is related to government as a way of
organising the conduct of others. ‘To govern, in this sense, is to structure the
possible field or action of others’ (1983a: 221). Here Foucault is still caught
up in his old structuralist language, but what he really means is not structure
but organisation as the new form of power and the new substance of politics.
‘The exercise of power is not a naked fact, an institutional right, nor is it a
structure which holds out or is smashed: it is elaborated, transformed, organ-
ised; it endows itself with processes which are more or less adjusted to the
situation’ (1983a: 224). Under such conditions, power relations ‘have been pro-
gressively governmentalized, that is to say, elaborated, rationalised, and cen-
tralised in the form of, or under the auspices of, state institutions’ (1983a: 224).
Foucault captured these changes in the nature of power in his statement that
power relations are ‘both intentional and nonsubjective’ (Foucault 1998: 94).
This is the closest he came to Dewey’s It thinks. And it is the furthest he
moved from traditional political thinking.
It seems, however, that this idea of non-subjectivity gets lost in his sub-
sequent works on ethics (1983b), and especially in History of Sexuality
Volumes 2 and 3. There he became more concerned with fears and the need
to think individually and act collectively: ‘My point is not that everything is
bad, but that everything is dangerous . . . If everything is dangerous, then
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we have something to do’ (1983b: 231–232). The activism he is envisaging is
rooted in an ethics driven by personal virtues and separate from other
forms of social activity. Foucault wrote, ‘I think we have to get rid of this
idea of an analytical or necessary link between ethics and other social or econ-
omic or political structures’ (1983b: 236). It is at this juncture that Foucault’s
pragmatism becomes metaphysical again, revealing his difficulty with com-
pletely leaving behind his past metaphysical position. It is this difficulty
that was to make him ‘abandon’ (Donzelot 2008) the study of power and
turn to ethics and the ethical self – a move that shifts him away from the prag-
matism of the HS1, and from Dewey’s It thinks, making him embrace notions
of the self that unavoidably reinstate the (Kantian) subjective free will. Was
this abandonment, or as some have described it a ‘long detour’ (Starkey and
Hatchuel 2002), the result of a mistake that directed him toward new research
focused on ethics rather than politics?
What can we hope for? Discussion and conclusion
I believe that Foucault, even when taking a strongly practical stand, underes-
timated how people’s experiences and activities could also influence politics
and power through their organisations, making him neglect how the insti-
tutions of a culture always articulate through organised habits and people’s
modes and moods and their shared social practices. In other words, he
failed to consider that people and their practices embedded in a shared
culture (customs) can also work on the institutions and influence their
conduct (policies). As past politics and power needed disciplinary institutions
to impose sovereignty, now power and politics need organisation to order,
administer and manage the economy of life. But to elaborate on this important
element, it would have required an analysis of events, human activities and
experiences and that, at that time, was probably beyond Foucault’s methodo-
logical capability. Instinctively, he turned his attention to micro phenomena
such as practices and activities, the body and embodied experiences, self-
knowledge and self-care. And this is, in my view, why he so strongly turned
to a consideration of ethical practices, especially in his final years. Ethical prac-
tices might have appeared to him to be the sole practicable answer to a power
that could productively organise individuals and their activities – shaping
their subjectivity as a unilateral process. In the end, however, his attempts to
reject old thinking and avoid a return to sovereignty might have taken up so
much of his intellectual energy, particularly at the level of language, that it
made him overlook the content of his organisation and the activities and
experiences of those who are formed by it and who form it.
In spite of this, HS1 remains a strong book. Hence, Foucault himself might
not have realised how deeply he was already cutting through traditional pol-
itical thinking. According to Dreyfus and Rabinow, this ‘increasing organis-
ation of everything’ as the ‘central issue of our time’ (1983: xxvi) remained
empirically underdeveloped in HS1, making Foucault appear far too
‘elusive’. The problem, however, is not one of will. It is not that Foucault
did not want to explain organisation. The fact is that he could not explain
what he had discovered. And this is a problem of methodology. Dreyfus
and Rabinow (1983) see how Foucault’s method did not allow him to elaborate
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on some of his central assumptions. They argue that the reason for the meth-
odological impossibility lay in his theoretical background: ‘He is so good at the
history of systems of thought (practices), that he cannot deal with thoughts and
practices when they are not systematically interrelated’ (1983: 261).
Dreyfus and Rabinow somehow consider Foucault’s problem to be an
intrinsic limitation caused by a lack of understanding of everyday practices,
of concrete social reality, but above all of physical reality at any given time
(1983: 262). I see the acute sensibility of their conclusion, and partially agree
with it. But perhaps there is more at stake. The notion of organisation
moves us away from traditional thinking: the form of power has changed
and so has the content of politics. Here clearly lies Foucault’s incontestable
creative and productive contribution. His metaphysical background,
however, did not allow him to renounce the idea of the subject completely.
‘My objective . . . has been to create a history of the different modes by
which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects’ (Foucault 1983a:
208). He seems to assume that critical subjects will be able to identify the iden-
tity imposed upon them and ‘refuse what we are’ (1983a: 216). Such a process
of refusal, however, would necessitate a point of reference. To refuse what we
have become we would have to know what lies ahead and consider it as
superior, as the good subjectivity to be pursued. To know what lies ahead is
not in our power unless we are able to identify the ‘objective consequences’
(Dewey 1922: 19) of present actions beyond all the contingencies and luck
that might also play a role in how things ultimately turn out. This is not an
impossible task, but it requires physical and psychological resources, and
not just a solitary will to change. To argue in favour of a refusal of what one
is, the metaphysical Foucault must assume that reason, virtues and delibera-
tions will guide the search for a new, freer, better self. But Levi’s accounts
showed that physical action comes before moral reasoning. As Dewey
stated, ‘in case of a pinch, the mass prefer to be good fellows rather than to
be good men’ (1922: 5).
The problem is that we have to live with Foucault’s legacy which,
although difficult and at times elusive, still seems to offer a way out of its
own limits. In fact, an increasing number of works embedded in empirical
studies has demonstrated the potential of his language and ideas. Seen from
this perspective, Dreyfus and Rabinow’s fear that Foucault’s work could
risk becoming an historical gloss to archival research, that it could end up
being ‘incorporated into empirical historical procedures’ (1983: 127), was
perhaps too pessimistic. They keep lamenting that the lack of empirical
proof has always been Foucault’s major weakness: ‘Foucault clearly owes us
a more explicit account of how he is proceeding in many areas’ (Dreyfus
and Rabinow 1983: 127). But I think that this is an expectation that he could
not satisfy methodologically at the time of his writing, and perhaps it was
not his task to fill the gaps. Others are now doing exactly that. For example,
Deutscher has taken great pains to show how, in HS1, reproduction is included
through its exclusion: ‘procreative sex plays no rhetorically decisive role in the
work, yet as a preoccupation, it reproduces itself through the work’ (Deutscher
2012: 131). Deutscher is left with very few hints from Foucault to substantiate
her thesis about reproduction, and, although her line of reasoning is convin-
cing, she is forced to admit that as ‘small as it is, I draw attention to this
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intersection as the reproductive “hinge” in the work, a hinge which is not the-
matized’ (2012: 124). In her interpretation of HS1, Deutscher is clearly influ-
enced by Foucault’s language and his recurring idea of the administration of
confirming a trend toward the notion that reproductive sex must first of all
be organised. Va¨liaho’s work provides another example, especially where he
points to the ‘management of affectivity’ and physiological forms of ‘self-
organisation’ (2012: 65). Expressions such as ’the administration of’ and ’the
management of’ recur several times not only in his works but also in other bio-
political works concerning affectivity and habits, seemingly giving further
support to the proposition that currently taking care of life means nothing
other than to organise the body and its organs, to manage life, to govern
through a politics that is organisational first and foremost. As shown in the
preceding discussion, Foucault’s notion of power as organisation can help
us read Levi’s biographical accounts differently. It can help us conceive of
habits and social practices as being more intentional than subjective, more
organised than imposed. These are important achievements.
HS1 is Foucault’s most courageous book. The same level of clarity of
expression and intellectual independence does not occur in any of his other
books. In HS1, Foucault challenged a whole intellectual tradition that con-
ceived of power as being top-down and repressive. He threw a challenge to
us by arguing that modern politics and power are economic in method and
organisational in content – that organisation is the new form of power and
the new substance of politics. It is now up to us to further explore the practical
meaning of his ideas and pay due respect to his legacy.
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